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1. Introduction 
In comprehensive diagnoses of contemporary society many social scientists emphasise that societal 
decision-making occurs under conditions of growing uncertainty. This was a basic theme in theories on late 
modern risk society, coined during the last decades of the 20th century.1 Societal thinking became 
dominated by risk, referring both to risks due to technological changes and risks related to the cultural and 
societal environment. The focus was often on new catastrophic risks, like those related to the use of 
nuclear power, but also on somewhat more limited risks generated, for example, by new modes of 
transportation, the increasing use of various hazardous substances as well as broadening patterns of 
automation. Among societal risks the global risks related to the working of the financial market are obvious 
examples. In addition, to some extent it may be rather a question of growing risk perception in societal 
thinking than a real increase in risk patterns.2 In general, chaos and ambivalence were presented as 
characteristic features of society.3  
During the present century the uncertainty of decision-making seems to have grown further. The causality 
chains in an ever more complicated societal environment seem to be becoming increasingly complex as a 
consequence of disruptions brought about by globalisation, digitalisation and technology that advance at 
an ever growing speed. Uncertainty, also with regard to the working of the political system, seems almost 
to have become a dominating feature of contemporary society. 
At the same time, however, there is a growing demand for societal decisions, as risks are created by human 
action or at least perceived as being related to human action. This creates the paradox of the risk society: 
the demand for decisions increases at the same time as the outcome of decision-making is increasingly 
uncertain and met with growing distrust. Under such conditions, legitimate decision-making appears as a 
learning process: management of societal complexity requires an experimental culture.4 Instead of 
following dogmas, decision-makers are required to be able to flexibly adjust their decision-making patterns 
based on experience of the consequences of previous decisions. 
This is clearly a challenge for law and regulation as well.5 On the one hand it is difficult for law to cope with 
uncertainty;6 on the other hand there is a constant demand for new regulatory measures, as new risks 
appear and security expectations are rising. This leads to conflicting demands on regulation, continuously 
                                                             
1 Ulrich Beck Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1986) 
(translation: Risk society: Toward a New Modernity). 
2 Niklas Luhmann Soziologie des Risikos (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1991) (translation: Sociology of Risk). 
3 Zygmunt Bauman Modernity and Ambivalence (Polity Press, Oxford & Cambridge, 1991). 
4 Anthony Giddens “Living in a Post-Traditional Society” in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (eds) Reflexive 
Modernization (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994) 56 at 59 claims – concerning global risks – that “modernity has become 
experimental”. 
5 I have analysed late modern uncertainty in relation to consumer law in Thomas Wilhelmsson “The Paradox of the 
Risk Society and the Fragmentation of Consumer Law” in Iain Ramsay and others (eds) Risk and Choice in Consumer 
Society (Ant N Sakkoulas, Athens, 2007) 1 and in relation to tort law (unfortunately in Swedish only) in my book 
Thomas Wilhelmsson Senmodern ansvarsrätt, Privaträtt som redskap för mikropolitik (Kauppakaari, Helsingfors 2001) 
(translation: Late Modern Liability Law, Private Law as a Tool for Micropolitics).  
6 Ulrich Beck “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization” in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash (eds) Reflexive Modernization (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994) 1 at 5 diagnoses the risk society 
as a society in which “the social, political, economic and individual risks increasingly tend to escape the institutions for 
monitoring and protection in industrial society.” 
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pushing both for new regulation and for deregulation, as well as for re-regulation in various combinations. 
Such conflicting demands also affect basic private law, and, in terms of risk management, tort law in 
particular. It seems that law has to become experimental as well.  
Indeed, court activism based on tort law has in legal discourse been offered as a response to this challenge. 
In German doctrine Gert Brüggemeier has noted that at least some answers to the challenges related to 
uncertainty and risk can be given by tort law.7 He has described contemporary tort law as a learning 
process that brings together courts, legal science, representatives of the interests involved, the media, 
public bodies and semi-private regulatory bodies in dealing with complex risks.8 In German discourse others 
have uttered similar views, phrasing the catchword “risk steering through liability”.9 As uncertainty cannot 
be removed by public law regulation, court procedures based on private law may function as a kind of last 
resort for those needing legal protection.10 
This is of course not a German discourse alone. Such mechanisms are under discussion in other parts of 
Europe as well.11 The discussion has not halted with the shift of the millennium. On the contrary, there is an 
ongoing discussion on tort law as a device for risk regulation during the 21st century, too.12 
The focus on learning is not restricted to tort law and risk only, but similar analyses relate to private law in 
general. Hugh Collins has noted how the reorientation of legal discourse “towards the instrumental 
reasoning of welfarist regulation” tends to promote a law that is able to learn from societal experience:13 
The trajectory of legal evolution alters from the private law discourse of seeking the better coherence for its 
scheme of principles to one of learning about the need for fresh regulation by observations of the consequences 
of present regulation. Information about the world, especially market practices, has to be gathered and 
reconstituted in a form which enables the legal discourse to adjust its own internal operations and regulatory 
outcomes. 
From a common law perspective Anthony Ogus has summed up the role of the courts in learning to cope 
with risks in an illustrative way: 14 
Of course, judges undertake this task in a broad, impressionistic manner; there is no expectation that they will 
quantify the costs and benefits. Further, although the adjudication of private law claims enables the victim to 
have a direct input into the decision-making process, the adversarial setting also means that judges will be 
almost wholly reliant on the parties for the data. Also, they are likely to possess neither expertise on the 
scientific or technical dimensions of the case nor experience of cost-benefit analysis. At the same time, these 
                                                             
7 Gert Brüggemeier ”The Control of Corporate Conduct and Reduction of Uncertainty by Tort Law” in Robert Baldwin 
and Peter Crane (eds) Law and Uncertainty, Risks and Legal Processes (Kluwer, London, 1997) 57 at 63. 
8 Gert Brüggemeier Prinzipien des Haftungsrecht (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999) (translation: Principles of Liability Law) 
at 31. 
9 Fritz Nicklisch ”Risikosteuerung durch Haftung im deutschen und europäischen Technologie- und Umweltrecht” in 
Friedrich Graf von Westphalen and Otto Sandrock (eds) Lebendiges Recht – Von den Sumerern bis zur Gegenwart 
(Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg, 1995) (translation: “Risk Steering through Liability in German and European 
Technology and Environmental Law” in Living Law – from the Sumerians to the Present) 617. 
10 Reinhard Damm “Risikosteuerung im Zivilrecht – Privatrecht und öffentliches Recht im Risikodiskurs” in Wolfgang 
Hoffmann-Riem and Eberhardt Schmidt-Assmann (eds) Öffentliches recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige 
Auffangordnungen (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996) (translation: “Risk Steering in Civil Law – Private Law and Public Law 
in Risk Discourse” in Public Law and Private Law as Reciprocal Catching Orders) 85 at 136. 
11 See, for example, the interesting paper by Jenny Steele “Damage, Uncertainty and Risk: Trends in Environmental 
Liability” in Thomas Wilhelmsson and Samuli Hurri (eds) From Dissonance to Sense: Welfare State Expectations, 
Privatisation and Private Law (Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999) 479. 
12 See for example, Elbert R de Jong “Tort Law and Judicial Risk Regulation: Bipolar and Multipolar Risk Reasoning in 
Light of Tort Law’s Regulatory Effects” (2018) 9 European Journal of Risk Regulation 14, with references. 
13 Hugh Collins Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) at 8.  
14 Anthony Ogus “Risk Management and ‘Rational’ Social Regulation” in Robert Baldwin (ed) Law and Uncertainty, 
Risks and Legal Processes (Kluwer, London-The Hague-Boston, 1997) 139 at 141. 
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very facts may enable them to take a more ‘rounded’ approach to the issues than is likely within a bureaucratic 
context. To some extent, that approach should reflect public attitudes to risk. Judicial independence of 
government should mean that short-term political considerations are not taken into account. 
In short, case law based on sufficiently flexible rules is offered as a solution – or rather, as one part of the 
solution – to the problem, namely how to deal with the challenge of uncertainty in late modern, globalised 
and digitalised risk society. 
This adaptability of the law to continuously new challenges has above been described as a learning process. 
Learning indeed seems to be an appropriate metaphor for what is expected of law as a response to the 
uncertainties of contemporary society. I will here use the term “learning law” for a law that is able to 
flexibly channel experience based on new challenges in real life into its normative structure.   
Tort law in particular has been presented as a learning law or at least as a part of law that could fulfil the 
learning functions required by contemporary society. A learning tort law, in other words, is a tort law that 
can develop through flexibly channelled real-life experience introduced into its established patterns of 
reasoning. Although all participants in the legal game, from the legislator to doctrine and the courts, are 
participating in this endeavour, case law clearly plays a significant role with regard to the responsiveness of 
the system. Courts work at the meeting point where new real-life questions in concrete form encounter the 
normative structure. A tort law that can be flexibly developed by case law in accordance with societal 
needs and a sense of justice is a learning tort law. 
This brings me, finally, to my chosen topic. Nordic private law – and I here deal with the laws of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden – is well known for being flexible and instrumentalist, including a legal 
engineering vision of law.15 The rules of Nordic tort law are relatively flexible in comparison with other 
jurisdictions.16 Against the background described above, it is natural to ask whether and to what extent 
Nordic tort law can function as a learning law, coping with uncertainty by dealing with new risks in an 
experimental fashion. 
The idea of a learning law may be particularly relevant in the context of Nordic legal culture, as the general 
trust in the courts here is higher than in most other countries.17 The appeal of such a theory might be very 
different in a country with less trust in the judiciary. “Learning” might not only mean achieving “good” 
solutions, it might bring law in a less fortunate direction as well. This paper should therefore not be read as 
a plea for unlimited judicial discretion, but only as an analysis of how the discretion the Nordic courts have, 
is used. To what extent and in what way can Nordic case law be described as a concretisation of the theory 
of a learning law, as developed in German and European legal discourse? 
However, a comprehensive discussion concerning Nordic tort law from this point of view would require 
rather the space of a monograph than an article in a journal. I have therefore decided to test the question 
in relation to one particular theme, namely strict liability for dangerous activities. This doctrine, which is 
well known in many other jurisdictions as well, has been developed by Nordic scholars and Nordic courts 
without express authorisation in the Nordic Acts on torts. The doctrine seems to offer a good test bed for 
                                                             
15 Markku Helin Lainoppi ja metafysiikka (Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, Vammala, 1988) (translation: Legal 
Dogmatics and Metaphysics) at 437‒438, 442‒443 (the references are to the English Summary), Ole Lando “A Short 
Survey of the Laws of the Nordic Countries” in Ole Lando and others (eds) Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (Jurist- 
og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen, 2016) 13 at 22-24. 
16 The last resort of flexibilisation being a broad general clause that allows the courts to adjust the amount of damages 
if liability is considered unreasonably burdensome with regard to the tortfeasor’s and the injured party’s economic 
situation and other circumstances, see for example, the Finnish Act on Torts (Vahingonkorvauslaki/Skadeståndslag 
31.5.1974/412) ch 2, s 1(2).  
17 See Věra Jourová  “The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard” (Fact sheet, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 
May 2018) at Figs 9 and 11:  <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/justice_scoreboard_2018_factsheet_en.pdf>. 
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the question whether tort law really is able to increase learning about appropriate responses to new 
technological and societal risks, as it is directly geared towards the connection between liability and risk.  
In other words, the question posed in this paper is: Has the doctrine and case law on strict liability for 
dangerous activities in the Nordic countries worked and can it work as a device for coping with uncertainty 
concerning complex risks in the way assumed by those advocating the use of tort law as a learning law? In 
order not to create unrealistic expectations in the reader, a very short preliminary answer may be provided 
at this point: even though the Nordic doctrine on strict liability for dangerous activities offers an excellent 
tool for cumulating experience concerning the legal approach to new risks, the Nordic courts have used it 
to a varying degree and only relatively moderately. 
One explanation of this moderate approach by the courts that I will return to in the last section of the 
paper is the fact that legislation in the Nordic countries has been rather responsive to new developments 
and Nordic law therefore contains many enactments on no-fault schemes and strict liability. As the 
examples are manifold and not the same in each country, it would require a paper of its own to describe 
these enactments.18 Therefore only some examples will be mentioned in the following sections. In general 
Nordic tort law has been described as strongly insurance- and compensation-oriented. For personal injury 
in particular the basic compensation is offered by the general social insurance, and in addition there are 
several no-fault schemes, often enacted by law, but sometimes also introduced by a kind of collective 
agreements,19 and tort law proper only covers the rest, if the prerequisites for liability are fulfilled.20 
2. Concretising the Questions 
The choice of test bed is easy to justify, in principle. The question of strict liability versus negligence-based 
liability is an important topic in tort law discourse in many countries. A good indication of this is the fact 
that one encounters this discourse in the debate on European harmonisation of private law as well. The 
issue is dealt with in the academic proposals concerning a unified European tort law. Both the tort law 
provisions of the Draft Common Frame of Reference21 as well as the Principles of European Tort Law22 
include particular rules on strict liability, even though the main principle of course is negligence-based 
liability. As will be noted later, the concrete approach to the issue is not the same in these two bodies of 
European principles. 
Therefore, one may presume that case law drawing the lines between the two approaches can function as 
a usefully illustrative test when discussing the readiness of the legal order to encounter new risks in a 
flexible way. However, one should mention a serious caveat in this respect. Tort lawyers are well aware of 
the fact that the borderline between strict liability and negligence is by no means clear, and that many 
intermediate forms of liability are blurring the divide. Negligence-based liability may be sharpened and 
brought close to strict liability through various legal mechanisms such as reversing the burden of proof or 
                                                             
18 Such a Länderbericht (presentation country by country) style of presentation would also be extremely boring. 
19 For example, the no-fault drug compensation scheme is in Finland introduced through a collective insurance agreed 
by the drug industry and the drug importers (in force 1 July 1984; on the present Pharmaceutical injuries insurance, 
see <www.laakevahinko.fi/en/in-english/>), and in Sweden the pharmaceutical companies can join a similar collective 
insurance scheme (<https://lff.se/>). 
20 This approach has a long history. See Jan Hellner “The Swedish Alternative in an International Perspective” in Carl 
Oldertz and Eva Tidefelt Compensation for Personal Injury in Sweden and other Countries (Juristförlaget, Stockholm, 
1988) 17. 
21 Christian von Bar, Eric Clive and Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (Outline Edition, Sellier, Munich, 2009), available at 
<www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/2009_02_DCFR_OutlineEdition.pdf > 




applying a severe negligence assessment. Therefore, an analysis of case law that focuses exclusively on the 
formal divide between strict liability and negligence would not convey a complete picture of the situation.23 
However, even though I acknowledge the validity of this objection I believe that for the purpose of this 
paper a focus on the formal use of strict liability as an exception to the negligence principle, disregarding 
the middle ground, can provide sufficient elucidation of the general picture. This is because the difference 
between the two sides of the divide is clear in principle: negligence-based liability focuses on fault or guilt 
and strict liability on risk. The issue at hand is how law reacts to new risks. 
In the Nordic countries, as in many other places, cases of strict liability have evolved in a fragmented way. 
In addition, even though many parts of private law are harmonised in the Nordic countries, nevertheless 
clear variations are evident between the countries concerning the issue at hand. It is in other words both 
nationally and in a Nordic context easy to express a typical legal coherence-praising critique against both 
fragmentation and variations. However, as hinted at in the introduction, the lack of a coherent approach 
does not have to be seen as a deficiency, but may be seen as a strength as well, as the need for continuous 
learning processes under contemporary conditions of growing uncertainty may require a pointillistic, 
situation-bound approach to tort liability. In this paper the Nordic development of strict liability in tort is 
analysed from this less negative perspective.   
I am here interested in particular in case law and jurisprudence as devices of learning and experimental 
development of law. Therefore I will not give any detailed account of the abundance of relatively casuistic 
legislation introducing strict liability in a variety of situations in the Nordic countries. As a background it is 
important to bear in mind, however, that in the Nordic countries, too, the legislator has been an active 
participant in the learning processes that have expanded strict liability to new situations. These situations 
cover not only the usual suspects ‒ traffic and workplace accidents ‒ but several other situations as well. I 
will mention some examples later.   
With these starting points the question posed in this paper can be approached in somewhat more concrete 
terms. The issue whether the doctrine and case law on strict liability for dangerous activities can in the 
Nordic countries be understood as a useful legal device for coping with uncertainty concerning complex 
risks can be illuminated by an analysis of questions such as the following. 
First of all, it is interesting to look at the flexibility of the way in which the borderline between negligence 
and strict liability is drawn. Is the borderline flexible enough to allow for new solutions, and have the courts 
been ready to use that flexibility? How is flexibility balanced against stability? In order to have an impact, 
the new rules emerging in the learning process have to be stabilised as a part of the compensation system. 
The mirror of tort law is insurance, which requires calculability and collectivity.24 It should be noted, 
however, that this stability requirement does not pose insurmountable obstacles for flexibility. Stability 
does not necessarily require a coherent body of fixed broad rules, as small, detailed areas of stability may 
suffice. As will be shown, the approaches in the different Nordic countries are not identical as to how 
systematically the issue is dealt with. 
Secondly, in the Nordic setting an additional interesting question arises related to learning through case 
law: Does learning occur across borders? Are courts and jurisprudence in the Nordic countries eager to 
                                                             
23 Nils Jansen “Principles of European Tort Law?” (2006) 70 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht /The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law 732 at 751, 769 rightly criticises the use 
of this dichotomic approach in European harmonisation projects.  
24 Francois Ewald L’état providence (translation: The Welfare State) (Grasset, Paris, 1986) and Francois Ewald “Die 
Versicherungs-Gesellschaft” (1989) (translation: “The Insurance Society”) 22 Kritische Justiz 385, in particular at 390. 
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learn from experience in other Nordic countries? This opportunity may expand the pool of experience on 
which possible learning processes are built. 
Thirdly, as mentioned already, a functioning compensation order requires an element of collectivity. One 
element of this requirement relates to the nature of the subject of liability. The issue of collectivity is 
accordingly approached through the following question: To what extent are strict liability learning 
processes targeting the liability of businesses or other actors that can pulverise the risk? 
Fourthly, as the uncertainty of contemporary society and the need for a flexible and learning tort law has 
been related to the ever faster development of new technological risks, it is natural to look at case law 
from the technology perspective as well. To what extent is Nordic case law on strict liability used to cope 
with new technological risks? 
Finally, as this paper is based on my presentation at a conference on the ability of private law to respond to 
accident, illness and disability, it is natural to ask to what extent Nordic case law concerning strict liability 
has dealt with cases of personal injury. Does case law on strict liability have anything to contribute to this 
issue?  
It is easy to assume that traditional tort law alone, even with flexible opportunities to create new cases of 
strict liability, cannot cope with the need for a law that is constantly developing on the basis of new 
experience. Courts may even fail precisely in cases in which their intervention is most needed. The well- 
known “floodgate argument” may induce a reluctance to embrace new solutions in the practically most 
important cases where the occurrence to be judged may result in damage to a large number of people. 
Instead of assuming the impossible, one should therefore rather analyse tort law litigation as a part of a 
flexible policy mix that uses opportunities across disciplines ‒ offered, for example, by contract law, tort 
law and public law25 ‒ to cope with contemporary uncertainty. My question is not whether Nordic tort law 
is the solution to the need for a learning law, but rather whether it can contribute anything to the required 
mixture of various legal tools required to master this challenge. 
3. Nordic Strict Liability: Enumerating and Generalising Methods 
One may of course define and delimit the areas in which strict liability should prevail in a great variety of 
ways. In order to facilitate the analysis I will here, based on comparative discourse, and on a very general 
level distinguish two kinds of approaches to the issue.  
One approach is to operate with a concrete list of activities on which strict liability is applied, and recognise 
that this list should be expanded predominantly by the legislator. In European harmonisation projects this 
seems to be the solution of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. According to this set of rules, strict 
liability would cover damage caused by the unsafe state of an immovable object, by animals, by defective 
products, by motor vehicles and by dangerous substances or emissions. Other accountability for the 
causation of damage would arise only if national law so provides.26 I will call such an approach the 
enumerating method. 
A broader approach is to use a general clause type of provision, often in addition to a list of particular 
situations, which broadly defines possible instances of strict liability. Typically this kind of general clause 
refers to the dangerous nature of the activity to be assessed. This gives courts more power to create and 
                                                             
25 As recommended by Dieter Hart “Sozialschutsbezogene Normbildungsprozesse bei Risikoentscheidungen im 
Vertragsrecht” (1991) (translation: “Social security related norm creation processes related to risk decisions in 
contract law”) 74 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 363 at 376. 
26 DCFR, above n 21, at VI.-3:202-207. 
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develop new instances of strict liability. In Europe the Principles of European Tort Law has chosen this 
approach, which is here called the generalising method:27  
A person who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable for damage 
characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and resulting from it. 
However, in this general clause the hurdle for applying strict liability is set rather high, as the provision 
requires the activity to be “abnormally” dangerous. Other variations of the generalising method may 
accept much lower levels of danger to trigger the opportunity to apply strict liability. For example, as 
will be shown below, many of the activities for which Nordic case law has established strict liability 
cannot naturally be labelled “abnormally dangerous”.  
Usually the issue is approached by a method that combines both enumerating and generalising 
elements. When comparing Nordic laws, however, the distinction between predominantly 
enumerating and generalising approaches is useful, because it illuminates the variations in the paths 
chosen in the Nordic countries. When describing Nordic tort law in the light of this pair of concepts, 
clear differences become apparent. Bearing in mind that the Nordic countries have for more than a 
century striven towards harmonising private law in the Nordic sphere,28 and have succeeded fairly well 
in the area of contract law,29 differences in the area under discussion present a particularly interesting 
indication of the concrete nature of national learning processes. 
It is important to note that there were no strong path dependencies that would have forced 
development in different directions. On the contrary, the starting point for development, more than a 
century ago, was at least partially joint. The 1914 monograph by the Danish scholar Henry Ussing on 
liability for dangerous activities30 was highly influential in the whole area and was discussed 
throughout the Nordic countries.31 Much of the initial development in the Nordic countries was related 
to this discourse. 
However, developments soon went in somewhat different directions in the different countries. 
Generalising very strongly, Norway appears the most strict liability-friendly, at least when looking at 
the development of case law, whilst, paradoxically, courts in Henry Ussing’s homeland, Denmark, show 
the least interest in creating new instances of strict liability. Finland and Sweden can be placed 
somewhere in between. In the following discussion I will look more closely at each Nordic country, 
ordered according to how supportive to strict liability they appear. 
                                                             
27 European Group of Tort Law Principles of European Tort Law (Springer, Vienna, 2005) at art 5:101(1). For a similar 
approach in the USA, see American Law Institute Restatement of Torts (2nd ed, Philadelpia, 1977)§ 520, American Law 
Institute Restatement of Torts (3rd ed, Philadelpia, 2009)§ 20(b). 
28 And nowadays even formally committed to do so: the 1962 Helsinki agreement on cooperation between the Nordic 
countries (Samarbetsöverenskommelse mellan Danmark, Finland, Island, Norge och Sverige, FördrS 28/1962 (signed 
23 March 1962, entered into force 1 July 1962)), art 4 expressly obliges the Nordic countries to make their private law 
as similar as possible. This treaty was registered with the United Nations: United Nations Treaty 434 UNTS 6262 
(registration period June 1962-July 1962).   
29 See Lando and others (eds) Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen, 
2016). 
30 Henry Ussing Skyld og skade: Bør erstatningspligt udenfor kontraktsforhold være betinget af culpa? (GEC Gad, 
Copenhagen, 1914) (translation: Fault and damage: Should liability not based on contract require negligence?). 
31 Håkan Andersson Ansvarsproblem i skadeståndsrätten (Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, 2013) (translation: Liability Problems 
in Tort Law) at 152-153. 
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Before looking at case law, one should mention, however, that all the Nordic countries have a fair 
number of legislative acts on strict liability concerning particular activities, relating, for example, to 
transportation, energy and the environment. The examples are manifold, and as it is difficult to find a 
consistent line in each national setting,32 clearly the variations are large when comparing the Nordic 
countries. There are many particular pieces of legislation that I cannot enumerate in detail here. It is 
just important to note that not only courts participate in legal learning processes. Casuistic legislation 
on strict liability ‒ sometimes even too casuistic: in Sweden special legislation prescribes strict liability 
for damage caused by dogs, but not by cats33 ‒ contributes to the process as well. Continuous 
interaction between the legislative and judicial learning processes is important to bear in mind. 
Only a few of the enactments are referred to later in the analysis of the law’s development. As 
mentioned before, the focus in this paper is on the role of case law and jurisprudence. It should be 
noted, however, that many, but certainly not all, of the particular enactments’ subjects can also be 
grouped under the general heading of dangerous activities. This strengthens the general 
understanding that strict liability may be used in connection with dangerous activities and offers 
support for analogies in case law.34 Casuistic legislation is a part of the continuing discourse on strict 
liability and negligence in Nordic tort law. 
Looking at case law, among the Nordic countries Norway is clearly most open towards developing new 
cases of strict liability. Norwegian professor Fredrik Stang, who in 1919 claimed that the negligence 
principle was not sufficient to handle the risks of an industrialised society and emphasised that the 
masses should be protected against individuals,35 was highly influential.36 Echoing Henry Ussing, Stang 
underlined that an activity was acceptable only if it brought benefits that were greater than the 
damage it caused. But as the benefit is greatest for the person reaping the profits of the activity, that 
person should also bear the costs.37 This was particularly the case with regard to dangerous activities. 
Inspired by these thinkers, the Norwegian courts have developed strict liability in many areas.38 
Through extensive case law, both courts and jurisprudence have been able to approach the issue in a 
generalising way, focusing on the elements that should have relevance in the assessment rather than 
only on particular situations. Generally a person or an entity whose activity causes more or less 
continuous risk for others should be strictly liable for damage caused by that activity and should bear 
the economic consequences when the risk materialises.39 Several factors are to be taken into account 
when this starting point is concretised. They relate to assessment of the risk – can it be labelled 
extraordinary, is it typical of the activity and is it continuous? – and to placement of the risk – is risk 
                                                             
32 For Denmark see Bo von Eyben and Helle Isager Lærebog i erstatningsret (8th ed, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets 
Forlag, 2015) (translation: Textbook on Tort Law) at 295. 
33 Lagen om tillsyn över hundar och katter (Lag 2007:1150) (translation: Act on Surveillance of Dogs and Cats) s 19, 
about an earlier act from 1943 introducing this distinction, see Jan Hellner Skadeståndsrätt (5th ed, Juristförlaget, 
Stockholm, 1995) (translation: The Law of Torts) at 180-181. 
34 Andersson above n 31,  at 317 who notes, however, that one might argue e contrario as well. 
35 Fredrik Stang Erstatningsansvar (Aschehoug, Christiania, 1919) (translation: Liability to Pay Damages) at 43-45. 
36 Trine-Lise Wilhelmsen and Birgitte Hagland Om erstatningsrett (Gyldendal, Oslo, 2017) (translation: On Tort Law) at 
83. 
37 Stang , above n 35, at 145. 
38 In its tobacco judgment (Unni Lund v  Tiedemanns Tobaksfabrik AS Rt 2003 p 1546 (SC) at [39]) the Norwegian 
Supreme Court itself notes that strict liability in Norwegian law is developed through extensive case law. 
39 Wilhelmsen and Hagland, above n 36, at 218. 
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distribution fair and reasonable and what are the possible pulverising and preventive effects of 
liability?40 
Assessment of risk does not even require that the relevant danger should be extraordinary or novel. A 
good example is the so-called trapdoor case.41 Here, the Norwegian Supreme Court found strict 
liability in the case of a restaurant where damage was caused to a customer who had fallen through a 
trapdoor which was not locked. The Court interestingly – and this may be a special feature of Nordic 
culture – underlined that particular dangers had to be avoided in the context of restaurants, where 
alcohol was served. 
The broad use of strict liability related to risks that are labelled extraordinary, typical and continuous is 
so generalising that it is possible to speak of a general principle of strict liability based on Norwegian 
case law. Some have even claimed that this case law goes further than is accepted not only in the 
other Nordic countries but also in other foreign jurisdictions.42 
In Finland case law displays a combination of both the generalising and the enumerating method. The 
starting point here as well is the concept of dangerous activity.43 However, Finnish Supreme Court 
cases are considerably fewer than those from Norway. There is also less generalising discussion 
concerning the criteria according to which dangerous activities should be defined in modern Finnish 
doctrine.44 Doctrine often tends to enumerate situationally described cases in which strict liability has 
been constituted, such as liability for damage caused by use of explosives and ammunition as well as 
by activity including risk of fire, liability of the organiser of a car race for injury to a spectator and 
liability for damage caused by burst water pipes.45 In this context there is also often mentioned a case 
on liability of the state for damage caused by mass vaccination against polio, even though the reason 
for strict liability was the collective and state-invited nature of the measure, rather than the danger 
related to the activity.46 
Interestingly the Finnish Supreme Court relatively recently ‒ in the 1990s ‒ created a new broader case 
of strict liability that is relatively close to the notion of liability based on negligence. In these rulings 
liability is based on the existence of a defect, but the defect does not have to be shown to be the result 
of anyone’s fault. This strict “deficiency liability” was in two subsequent cases established for the 
owner or user of machines or equipment with damage-causing defects or deficiencies.47 The first case 
concerned personal injury to an employee caused by a falling part of a defective concrete mixer, whilst 
                                                             
40 At 220-234; Viggo Hagstrøm and Are Stenvik, Erstatningsrett (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 2015) (translation: The Law 
of Torts) at 156-205. 
41 Rt. 1991 p 1303. 
42 Hagstrøm and Stenvik, above n 40,  at 147. 
43 Mika Hemmo Vahingonkorvausoikeus (WSOYpro, Helsinki, 2005) (translation: The Law of Torts) at 95. 
44 The monograph by CH Ek Bidrag till läran om utomobligatoriskt skadeståndsansvar vid rättsenlig verksamhet enligt 
Finlands gällande civilrätt (Juridiska Föreningens publikationsserie, Helsingfors, 1943) (translation: Contribution to the 
Doctrine of Non-Contractual Liability for Legal Activity According to Finnish Private Law) has not received much 
attention. However, later attempts to formulate general criteria concerning strict liability are not lacking ‒ an 
overview is given by Olli Norros “Vastaako kaukolämpötoimittaja putkivuodosta johtuvista vahingoista 
tuottamuksestaan riippumatta?” (translation “Is a supplier of distance heating liable without fault for damage due to 
broken pipes?”) 117 Lakimies 80  at 83-84.   
45 Pauli Ståhlberg and Juha Karhu Finsk skadeståndsrätt (Talentum, Helsingfors, 2014) (translation: Finnish Tort Law) at 
167-176. 
46 KKO 1995:53 (SC). As this case was brought against the state, it was not covered by the drug compensation scheme. 
The Supreme Court here also accepted a lower burden of proof concerning causality. 
47 ”Bristfällighetsansvar”, see the cases KKO 1990:55(SC) and KKO 1991:156 (SC). 
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the second case concerned a part of a crane, which, due to a construction defect, had tumbled over 
and hit someone on the head. 
Some of the Finnish cases, like the car race case, demonstrate a readiness on the part of the courts to 
apply the principle of liability based on exceptionally dangerous activity to completely new situations. 
Therefore, even though doctrine often describes the prevailing situation simply by enumerating the 
activities for which strict liability is established, it is generally accepted that courts may expand the list 
when confronted with new cases.48 
Later case law in Finland shows that the courts in Finland are prepared to introduce strict liability even for 
activities that cannot easily be labelled dangerous according to the natural use of language. A case from 
1997 is illustrative, concerning fire caused in peat production. Here, the Supreme Court found liability to be 
strict, even though it expressly conceded that the activity as such did not fall within the ‘dangerous’ 
classification. However, as there was an obvious risk of fire that could lead to considerable damage related 
to the activity and as potential victims had limited opportunity to protect themselves compared to the 
ability of the peat producer to minimise risks and their consequences, the Supreme Court found that the 
producer should be strictly liable for damage by fire.49 Continuing in a similarly more generalising mood, 
the Supreme Court in 2000 expressly noted that strict liability is also possible with regard to an activity that, 
as such, is not to be deemed dangerous, but to which is linked an element of danger which is not 
completely controllable.50 
Again, in Sweden the principle of liability for damage caused by dangerous activity was accepted in the 
1920s. The cases were here related to exceptionally dangerous military exercises and use of 
explosives.51 Later, damage caused by a broken district heating pipe was added to the list52 and a case 
concerning burst water pipes followed the same pattern.53 Generally there have been few cases, 
compared to Norway and Finland, on strict liability that are not based on legislation, and Swedish legal 
doctrine has noted that the Swedish courts have not developed the law towards a wider use of strict 
liability.54 However, as the pipe cases were followed up by others and the approach was broadened by 
a case establishing strict liability of a municipal kitchen for food infected by salmonella,55 some have 
                                                             
48 Ståhlberg and Karhu, above n 45, at 174. 
49 KKO 1997:48 (SC). This case as well as cases on strict liability for safety defects in machines or equipment place 
liability on the business that controls the device or the activity and consequently also controls the risk (see also the 
case mentioned in the next footnote). Therefore I have discussed elsewhere (Wilhelmsson Senmodern ansvarsrätt 
above n 5, at 247) whether one could also introduce a stabilising formula in tort law that echoes the internationally 
recognised contract law formula that a business should be liable for what is deemed not to be beyond its control 
(United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art 79) ‒ or perhaps in tort law 
formulated positively: for what is deemed to be within its control. This formula could offer a basis for rationalising the 
concrete situation-bound discourse that strives to combine flexibility with stability and to balance economic power 
and liability. In addition, reasoning based on control could help tackle a challenge that appears crucial in 
contemporary internationalised tort law adjudication: under what conditions is it possible to pierce the corporate veil 
and bring a mother company to justice for injury caused by its daughter? The focus on control (of the daughter) in 
such cases seems realistic and to the point. 
50 A v ABB Strömberg Service Do 2 Oy KKO 2000:72 (SC). 
51 Hellner, above n 33,  at 178. 
52 NJA 1991 s 720 (SC). 
53 NJA 1997 p 468 (SC). 
54 Hellner, above n 33,  at 178. 
55 NJA 1989 s 389 (SC). 
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proclaimed the “return of strict liability” in Swedish case law.56 So perhaps Sweden at the moment can 
also be described as having established a combination of enumerating and generalising methods.   
Finally, in Denmark one can find some court decisions where strict liability was established without 
support from legislation. Of course, the Dane Henry Ussing doctrine acknowledges the concept of 
dangerous activity here as well. However, the cases are few in which the court has not only 
strengthened negligence-based liability in various ways, but has proceeded to strict liability. In addition 
to some cases concerning liability towards neighbours,57 one finds cases resembling case-law in the 
other Nordic countries: municipal liability for damage because of a burst water pipe or gas pipe has 
been considered strict.58 As the most important cases were decided in the 1980s, with no follow-up 
later, doctrine has concluded that the lines drawn by the Supreme Court are not in doubt and that 
there seems to be little need to expand the area of strict liability, as other methods of strengthening 
liability can be used instead. 59 It is said to be obvious that Ussing’s suggestion about strict liability for 
dangerous activity has not become living law.60 However, it cannot be ruled out that the Danish courts 
might in the future become more active in this direction.61 
Summing up the Nordic approaches, one encounters a combination of the enumerating approach and 
the generalising approach, based on a vague conception of ‘dangerous activity’. In some of these 
countries, in particular in Norway, the courts and jurisprudence are fairly generalising, whilst in others, 
in particular in Denmark, they rather prefer a (brief) enumeration. From the perspective of a learning 
law, a balanced combination of generalisation and enumeration is probably most preferable. I will 
analyse the Nordic approach(es) from the this perspective in the following. 
4. Nordic Strict Liability as a Vehicle of Learning Law 
As noted above, a well-functioning learning tort law requires a combination of flexibility ‒ which 
enables accumulation of learning through practice ‒ and islands of stability, which are needed to gain 
sufficient calculability for an insurance logic to operate. The Nordic combination of a generalising 
approach, assessing dangerousness and fair risk-distribution, and an enumerating approach might – 
well applied – respond to this combination of needs. The general clause on dangerous activities offers 
the required flexibility, whilst the growing case list, including particular legislation, pictures islands of 
stability and calculability. 
The opportunity to use strict liability supports a reasoning that focuses directly on assessment of risk 
and the fairness of the outcome rather than dressing these issues in the rather fictitious terminology of 
negligence. In particular the Norwegian way of analysing risk in combination with fairness, 
pulverisation and prevention62 offers a productive scheme for confronting new risks in a learning 
fashion. The possibility of such reasoning in the concrete assessment of a risk that has actually 
materialised can be a useful instrument for legal learning.  
In other words, Nordic doctrine on strict liability for dangerous activities, including both generalising 
and enumerating approaches, seems to offer a both systematically and substantively effective 
                                                             
56 Andersson, above n 31, at 313. 
57 von Eyben and Isager, above n 32, at 186-191. 
58 Copenhagen Water Supply Company v Uniform UFR 1983.86 H (SC); and  Helsingor v Jonsbo UFR 1983.895 H (SC). 
59 von Eyben and Isager, above n 32, at 185. 
60 At 205. 
61 This is discussed by von Eyben and Isager, above n 32, at 206-207. 
62 Wilhelmsen and Hagland, above n 36 at 220-234. 
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instrument for courts that are eager to contribute to learning how to deal with the complex risks of 
contemporary society. However, this is just an opportunity. One has to take a closer look at the 
content of case law, in the light of the concretised question posed at the beginning, namely to be able 
to evaluate how and to what extent courts really have made use of this opportunity.   
Clearly some learning has occurred, as the courts in all Nordic countries have expanded the field of 
strict liability in a situation-oriented fashion. However, there are indications that Nordic courts have 
not always been as bold as they should be in entering new territory. They might have been held back 
by the well-known “floodgate argument”, fearing that opening the doors for new liabilities would lead 
to an uncontrollable growth of litigation. The Finnish cases, where an employer was not liable for 
asbestos-related injury to employees, could be mentioned as examples of such caution.63 However, in 
these cases employees had had most of their losses compensated through mandatory insurance for 
workplace accidents and the businesses sued were not trading in asbestos.64 Another similar case in 
which one might feel the presence of a floodgate argument is the Norwegian tobacco case, in which a 
producer of tobacco was not considered strictly liable for personal injury due to smoking.65 
As far as learning has occurred, the open structure of Nordic tort law has enabled Nordic courts to 
learn across borders. Despite the fact that the approach to use of the principle of strict liability for 
dangerous activity has been somewhat different in the different Nordic countries, one can find several 
examples of cross-border exchange of experience. This may even be explicit: for example the Swedish 
Supreme Court expressly referred to Danish and Norwegian case law as support for strict liability in the 
broken district heating pipe case.66 In academic discourse on the issue some have also been very eager 
to draw inspiration across Nordic borders.67 As was easy to note in the description of case law, some of 
the examples of case law-based strict liability seem very similar in several Nordic countries: the cases 
on burst water and other pipes are perhaps the best examples of this.68 
Nordic case law on strict liability also seems well in line with the demands of the insurance society to 
steer liability toward subjects that can collectivise risk and so make it calculable. In Norway, in 
particular, the criteria used in generalising case law directs the focus on the liability of businesses that 
achieve their profit through activity that can be labelled dangerous. According to the established view, 
liability should follow if an activity includes a continuous risk that can be calculated and included in 
operating costs.69 In Finland, too, the liability of businesses is in the focus and in case law strict liability 
is only seldom placed on others than businesses.70 As is noted in Finnish doctrine, the same 
possibilities of systematic risk management are present in entities other than businesses, such as 
public entities, and they should therefore be included as possible subjects of strict liability as well.71 A 
                                                             
63 KKO 1998:87(SC) and KKO 1998:88(SC). 
64 Ståhlberg and Karhu above n 45, at 174. 
65 Unni Lund v  Tiedemanns Tobaksfabrik AS, above n 38.  
66 AL v Drefvikens Energi AB NJA 1991 s 720 (SC). 
67 Andersson, above n 31, at 308-312 expressly uses the Norwegian experience to discuss the opportunity to develop 
Swedish law. 
68 In addition one could mention case law on explosives and similar activities (in addition to the cases already 
mentioned one could refer to the Norwegian cases Rt 1909 s 851 (SC) and Rt 1917 s 202 (SC)). This case law was, 
however, already established a hundred years ago, long before the discourse on contemporary societal complexity. 
69 Wilhelmsen and Hagland, above n 36,at 229. 
70 Hemmo, above n 43, at 98; the same goes for particular legislation on strict liability, Ståhlberg and Karhu above n 
45, at 139. 
71 At 99. 
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good example here is the Finnish vaccination case.72 In Denmark, too, courts have referred to the 
opportunity for economic planning and calculability of risk as an argument ‒ here, however, speaking 
in favour of strict liability on the part of municipal actors. Doctrine has discussed whether or not this 
line of argument could be applied to businesses as well.73   
It is interesting to note that in all the Nordic countries a typical case – in which there clearly has been 
exchange of experience across borders – has been the liability of a public entity (a municipality or 
similar entity) in cases where water, gas or heating pipes have been broken and thereby caused 
damage. These cases are interesting also because they show the flexibility of the standard applied: It is 
openly admitted that the activity cannot be classified as particularly dangerous, but liability has been 
based on a kind of calculable inevitability.74 The Finnish case on strict liability for fire related to peat 
production could be mentioned as a similar example.75 So, as far as Nordic courts are engaged in a 
learning process, the process seems to strive at stability offered by collectivised calculability. Rational 
risk management, not the level or degree of danger, has become the central issue, which is clearly a 
useful focus when pondering how to deal with societal and technological uncertainty.  
The need for a learning law is evident in relation to rapidly developing technology. New technology 
constantly challenges established law. If Nordic case law was really experimental, one would expect to 
find interesting cases related to such technology. However, in this area the material is disappointing. 
Nordic case law does not offer striking examples of legal learning processes related to new technology.  
Instead, interesting examples of how tort law can react to modern technological issues can rather be 
found in some of the pieces of legislation on strict liability that form a part of the Nordic system. A 
good example is the Finnish act on gene technology. This regulates damage caused by genetically 
modified organisms and by the use of such organisms, using strict liability as the basis of liability.76 
From Finnish law one could also mention another good example: The needs of the information society 
are reflected in a couple of Finnish acts on various kinds of digital registers on persons, on titles, 
mortgages and real estate, on shares and on vessels. In these enactments the liability of the keeper of 
the register has consistently been made strict.77 These examples, and others from the other Nordic 
countries, illustrate the need to look at the field of strict liability as a whole, in which both the 
legislature and the courts are actively engaged in legal learning processes. 
Even though Nordic case law does not offer any striking examples of reactions to regulatory needs 
with regard to new technology, it has at least developed an interesting device for dealing with some of 
the problems related to technology. Combining a kind of enumerating approach and a generalising 
approach, some courts have prescribed strict liability for a user of machines or equipment suffering 
from defects or deficiencies that cause damage. Such liability for businesses has been introduced by 
                                                             
72 KKO 1995:53, above n 46. 
73 von Eyben and Isager, above n 32, at 196. 
74 Wilhelmsen and Hagland, above n 36, at 219; Hellner, above n 33,   at 179; and Andersson above n 31, at 315. 
75 KKO 1997:48 (SC). 
76 Geenitekniikkalaki/Gentekniklagen, 377/1995 Sec 36 (as amended by Act 847/2004) (translation: The Gene 
Technology Act). This legislation is based on EU law, but EU law does not prescribe any provisions on private law 
liability. 
77 Ståhlberg and Karhu above n 45, at 163-166. 
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the Supreme Court in Finland,78 at least for cases involving personal injury.79 The other Nordic 
countries, too, have seen discussion and case law on liability for defects in machines or equipment, 
with liability being either described upfront as strict or being made at least semi-strict through a 
severe assessment of negligence.80 This case law can be said to reproduce the starting point of 
European Union product liability law according to which a business, the producer, is strictly liable for 
safety defects in its products,81 but against a new subject, the business using the product. Perhaps 
product liability law has here functioned as a useful example in providing learning about one flexible 
way to deal with safety issues. If the Nordic courts continue to follow this road – case law is not 
completely unambiguous – and embrace the idea that users of machines and equipment should be 
strictly liable for damage caused by equipment that is not as safe as the public is entitled to expect, 
this may become a useful tool for dealing with damage caused by new technology. 
Summing up the assessments in this section of the paper one arrives at a rather unsettled general 
conclusion regarding the usefulness of the Nordic doctrine and case law on strict liability for dangerous 
activities as a device for learning how to cope with uncertainty. On the one hand it is evident that the 
doctrine, in particular in the way it has evolved in Norway and Finland, offers a viable instrument for 
courts wishing to contribute to legal learning processes and some learning across the borders has 
indeed happened as well. On the other hand it seems that the Nordic courts have not generally been 
very bold in making use of this opportunity. However, some bolder steps can be recognised as well, 
such as the focus in some case law on calculable inevitability rather than on dangers in the classic 
sense as well as the move towards strict or semi-strict liability for safety of machines and equipment.  
5. Solving the Issue of Personal Injury? 
Finally, as this paper is based on my presentation at a conference on personal injury, concerning the 
ability of private law to respond to accident, illness and disability, it is interesting to discuss whether and in 
what way the Nordic approach to dangerous activities can have something to contribute with regard to this 
issue. It is easy to see that many of the cases referred to above are not related to personal injury. The 
leading example of a joint approach between the Nordic countries, the cases on damage caused by 
various kinds of broken pipes, falls into this category. One may legitimately ask whether the 
development here described has any real significance with regard to personal injury. 
At the outset, the issue of strict liability for dangerous activity should be particularly important with 
regard to personal injury. In legal reasoning concerning application of strict liability for dangerous and 
risky activity, the gravity of possible damage is usually mentioned as one important criterion when 
assessing risk. The risk of personal injury is normally ‒ and rightly so ‒ considered graver than the risk 
of economic loss alone. This being the starting point, it is natural to ask why there are so few personal 
injury cases among the cases mentioned above. One might expect that the situation should be the 
reverse and that courts would tend to use strict liability in particular in situations where there is a 
considerable risk of personal injury.  
                                                             
78 KKO 1990:55(SC), KKO 1991:156 (SC), KKO 1995:108 (SC) and KKO 2000:72 (SC). 
79 Compare Supreme Court, KKO 1992:3, in which the principle was not extended to a defect in a payment system. 
Ståhlberg and Karhu above n 45, at 172 suggest that the court was reluctant to use the strict “deficiency liability”, 
because the case did not deal with personal injury. 
80 Andersson, above n 31, at 159. 
81 Defined as lack of ’safety which a person is entitled to expect’, see Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the 
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member states Concerning Liability for 
Defective Products (Products Liability Directive) [1985] OJ L 210/29 at art 6. 
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However, looking more closely at the issue, the answer is rather self-evident. Personal injury cases 
based on the principle of liability for dangerous activity load are few, because the most important 
sources of personal injury are already covered by legislatively enacted strict liability. Special legislation 
prescribing strict liability, often in combination with mandatory insurance – or even the other way 
around: mandatory insurance superseding tort law ‒ has taken care of the issue. These compensation 
systems are often perceived as based on insurance rather than tort law. 
As in most countries elsewhere, the Nordic countries have mandatory traffic insurance covering, for 
example, personal injury. For employment-related workplace accidents there are mandatory insurance 
schemes financed by employers. So, for the two biggest sources of personal injury, insurance schemes 
are in operation and there is little need for additional case law in this area based on the general 
doctrine of dangerous activities. These schemes are sometimes not even discussed in some of the 
typical textbooks on tort law, as insurance is the basis for compensation.82 
In addition to these two most obvious cases, one finds various schemes, again combining strict liability 
and mandatory insurance, for personal injury due to drugs as well as injury in patient care in the 
Nordic countries.83  General product liability, as prescribed by the EU Product Liability Directive, is 
strict as well, even though no mandatory insurance is involved. In practice, of course, businesses 
usually have product liability insurance of some kind. Many other examples of legislative introduction 
of strict liability that is relevant with regard to personal injury could be mentioned as well. Particular 
enactments in the areas of transportation and energy often include some form of strict liability.84  
Of course, for the well-known areas that produce the bulk of personal injury cases in contemporary 
society, traffic and work, it is important in legal decision-making to be as close as possible to the 
stability end of the stability-flexibility scale. When most cases are familiar and well-known as to their 
nature, there is less need for flexible learning, but considerable need for quick and easy administration 
of the system. The interests of the injured require a stable system. Therefore legislative solutions 
combining strict liability and insurance are natural in this context. 
However, an approach to strict liability that is based on particular enactments concerning particular 
activities will always leave some empty spots. Case law as a learning mechanism is required to fill these 
empty spots when societal justice seems to call for a tort law reaction to changes in society and 
technology. Several of the cases mentioned above do relate to personal injury and introduce strict 
liability for activity leading to such injury. Nordic case law on strict liability for dangerous activities 
thereby offers a contribution, perhaps modest but still worth mentioning, to the learning patterns 
required by late modern uncertainty, including in relation to personal injury. 
Looking at Nordic case law we now know, besides the obvious cases of damage caused by the use of 
explosives and similar activities, that the organiser of a car race (and probably other similarly 
                                                             
82 Ståhlberg and Karhu above n 45, explained at 143. These systems or parts of them are included, however, in Hellner 
, above n 33,  at 277-300; von Eyben and Isager, above n 32, at 202-205, 209-235; Hagstrøm and Stenvik, above n 40, 
at 272-299, 338-347; and Wilhelmsen and Hagland, above n 36, at 185-217 (under the heading ‘strict liability with 
financing’). 
83 Wilhelmsen and Hagland, above n 36, at 203-217; Hagstrøm and Stenvik, above n 40, at 317-337; Ståhlberg and 
Karhu above n 45, at 153-158 and Hellner , above n 33,  at 301-307, 327-329.  
84 For example, in Finland, Raideliikennevastuulaki/Lagen om ansvar i spårtrafik 113/1999, s 3 (translation: Act on 
Liability in Traffic on Track); Ilmailulaki/Luftfartslagen 1194/2009, s142 (translation: Act on Aviation); 
Sähköturvallisuuslaki/Elsäkerhetslagen 1135/2016, s 99 (translation: Act on Electricity Security); and 
Ydinvastuulaki/Atomansvarighetslagen 484/1972, s12 (translation: Act on Nuclear Liability). 
16 
 
dangerous competitions and events) in Finland is strictly liable for injury to spectators, and that the 
state bears strict liability for injury caused by mass vaccinations. Similarly in Sweden, a municipal 
kitchen bears strict liability for damage caused by salmonella (and probably other similar diseases). In 
Norway restaurants should not have trapdoors (and other similar “traps”) that would endanger their 
alcohol-consuming guests. And what seems more important: throughout the Nordic countries the 
business user of machines and equipment is by strict (or at least semi-strict) liability forced to bear the 
risk if defects and deficiencies in equipment are causing personal injury. In all these cases case law has 
functioned as a learning mechanism extending strict liability to new types of situations which were not 
covered by strict liability before. 
So, the conclusion as far as compensation for personal injury is concerned, echoing the conclusion in 
the previous section, is clear. The Nordic doctrine under scrutiny is not and cannot be a central vehicle 
for developing the law in this area, in particular when dealing with the sections of life that produce 
most of the cases. It might, however, occasionally function as a learning mechanism for filling the gaps 
remaining in the law concerning compensation for personal injury.  
As technology quickly evolves and society changes there is a manifest need for such a learning 
mechanism, as long as one is not prepared to introduce an all-covering New Zealand model for 
compensating personal injury. No serious proposals have been made for such a solution in the Nordic 
countries, even though the New Zealand model certainly is known and analysed85 in the Nordic 
countries as in other parts of the developed world.  
 
                                                             
85 Criticised for the low benefits it offers, Jan Hellner ”The Swedish Alternative in an International Perspective” in Carl 
Oldertz and Eva Tidefelt (eds) Compensation for Personal Injury in Sweden and other Countries (Juristförlaget, 
Stockholm, 1988) 17 at 26. 
